These fragments are parked here for later, because there is an idea here I want to remember and explore.
Seneca talking about virtue in Letter 71:22.
At this moment the man who measures the souls of all men by his own is shaking his fist in my face because I hold that there is a parity between the goods . . . .
And . . .
[C]ritics think that whatever they themselves cannot do, is not done; they pass judgment on virtue in the light of their own weaknesses.
The idea that I want to explore is how people (meaning me in particular) use their opinions as the metric for saying someone or something is virtuous.
The reason that Wittgenstein’s Ruler came to mind is that a judgment expressed is more informational on the person making the judgment than on the judgment itself.
Seneca is saying that virtue is the supreme thing. It’s as straight as it can be. There is nothing straighter. Virtue should be self-evident, then. All actions prompted by virtue will have that linear quality.
Seneca continues:
To a luxurious man, a simple life is a penalty; to a lazy man, work is punishment; the dandy pities the diligent man; to the slothful, studies are torture. Similarly, we regard those things with respect to which we are all infirm of disposition, as hard and beyond endurance, forgetting what a torment it is to many men to abstain from wine or to be routed from their beds at break of day. These actions are not essentially difficult; it is we ourselves that are soft and flabby.
And then, at 71:24, we find Wittgenstein’s Ruler:
We must pass judgment concerning great matters with greatness of soul; otherwise, that which is really our fault will seem to be their fault.
“That which is really our fault will seem to be their fault.”
Boom.